Isaac's Storm -- Book Review
Isaac's Storm: A Man, A Time, and the Deadliest Hurricane in
History.
By Eric Larson. New
York: Vintage/Random House. 1999. pp.
323.
This is a harrowing story of survival and death during the
Galveston Hurricane of 1900. The book
bills it as the deadliest hurricane in history, however the hurricane of 1780,
which struck the Western Caribbean during the American Revolution, and
Hurricane Mitch of 1998, did cause greater loss of life. But the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 is right
up there among the most deadly with an estimated 8000-12,000 deaths. This book
is not only a story of the Galveston Hurricane, but it is also a history of meteorology
and hurricane forecasting, a history of the U.S. Weather Service, and a
biography of Isaac Cline, the Weather Service's agent in charge of the
Galveston Bureau at the time of the hurricane.
The book is a magnificent accomplishment. I truly admire it. It has been scrupulously researched in
original sources at the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and the
Rosenberg Library of Galveston, many of which have not been touched since they
were deposited. There are detailed
footnotes. It is a gripping narrative
with many sub-narratives that interweave, yet do not get in each other's
way. The style is very readable and
draws the reader in and takes hold of you.
What I especially liked was Larson's ability to create a pervasive tone
of ominous foreboding amidst the retelling of rather mundane occurrences. People blithely went about their daily routine
business in Galveston during the days leading up to the hurricane without a
clue what was coming. Small decisions
were made that proved fateful. Minor
events, seemingly trivial, contained a hint of menace. Of course, it is hindsight that enables one
to make such a reconstruction. But there
is also the lingering question of whether greater attention had been paid to
certain small indicators, might the catastrophe been mitigated? No one had any concept of the magnitude of
what was coming. There had been storms
in Galveston before. People, including
Isaac Cline, constructed their houses on stilts in anticipation of flooding
from storms. They thought they were well
prepared. The problem was they
underestimated Nature and the massive power it can unleash.
Many of the lessons of this story will seem familiar and
timeless. The mercilessness and
indifference of Nature to the fate of living things and civilization. Nature truly does not care if we live or
die. We are not being punished, nor are we
being cared for, by anything that occurs in Nature.
The power of denial.
There are a number of examples of this throughout the book, but I will
single out two. Isaac Cline observed an
interesting phenomena during his first summer in San Angelo, Texas, of 1885
(before he was transferred to Galveston).
It was a long, hot summer on the Texas prairie. The Concho river was dry and temperatures
went as high as 140 degrees.
One evening in mid-August he
was walking toward town along his usual route, crossing the footbridge over the
riverbed, when he heard a roar from somewhere far upstream. Not thunder.
The roar was continuous, and got louder. He saw a carriage carrying a man and a two
women descend into the riverbed at a point where wagons and horsemen often
crossed. An escarpment of water that
Isaac estimated to be fifteen or twenty feet high appeared beyond the
carriage. Isaac began to run. The water caught the carriage broadside and
ripped it from the soil. Isaac reached
the other side of the riverbed just as the water surged past him, the carriage
tumbling like a tree stump in a spring flood.
The wagon passed. Rescue was
impossible.
His heart racing, Isaac looked
upstream. Men had gathered and with
their bare hands were plucking fish from the water. Large fish.
As Isaac walked toward the men, he saw a fish two feet long drift slowly
by. Me moved closer. The fish did nothing. He reached for the fish. It kept still. Isaac thrust his hands into the water, and
two things happened. He caught the fish;
he froze his hands.
It was August in Texas but
water had abruptly filled the riverbed and this water was the temperature of a
Tennessee creek in January, so cold it paralyzed fish.
But where had the water come
from? Isaac scanned the skies for the
rolling black-wool cloud typically raised by blue northers, but saw nothing.
Days later, townsmen recovered
the bodies of the carriage driver and his two female passengers.
And a week later, the mystery
of the ice-water flood was resolved.
Visitors from the town of Ben
Ficklin fifty miles up the Concho came to San Angelo and reported that a
monstrous hailstorm had struck about ten days earlier, the day of the
flood. The storm discharged stones the
size of ostrich eggs that killed hundreds of cattle and fell in such volume
they filled erosion gulches and piled to depths of up to three feet on level
ground. The ice melted quickly.
For Isaac this was explanation
enough. The deadly flood was the
downstream flow of flash-melted hail. He
wrote an article on the incident for the weather service's Monthly Weather Review, edited by Cleveland Abbe. To Isaac's "surprise and chagrin,"
Abbe rejected the article on grounds it was too far-fetched to be
believed. (pp. 61-2)
Isaac was annoyed at this rejection and went on to document
other cases of massive hailstorms across the Great Plains that caused great
destruction. They are not by any means
unprecedented.
Another case of denial is exhibited by the U.S. Weather
Service's handling of the storm in its forecasting. It was a widespread belief among forecasters
at the time that all hurricanes followed a curving path from the Caribbean
through Florida and then northeast into the Atlantic. They did not believe it was possible for a
hurricane to proceed from Cuba, west toward Galveston -- but that was exactly
what this hurricane did. Reports of the
storm and forecasts were issued consistent with these false expectations, but
contrary to facts on the ground. The
Cuban Weather Service, however, reported accurately on the storm and warned of
its danger. The U.S. Weather Service
banned the Cubans from transmitting their reports over telegraph lines to the
United States. They enlisted the help of Western Union in this effort.
Willis Moore, acting Secretary of Agriculture at that time,
wrote a letter to General Thomas T. Eckert, president of Western Union .
The United States Weather
Bureau in Cuba has been greatly annoyed by independent observatories securing a
few scattered reports and then attempting to make weather predictions and issue
hurricane warnings to the detriment of commerce and the embarrassment of the
Government service. . . I presume you
have not the right to refuse to transmit such telegrams, but I would
respectfully ask that they be not allowed any of the privileges accorded
messages of this Bureau, and that they be not given precedence over other
commercial messages. (p. 106)
The Cuban weather raised vigorous opposition to the ban, but
they were suppressed. After the storm, with
Galveston in ruins, The Cuban Weather Service's Julio Jover visited H.H.C.
Dunwoody, head of the U.S. Weather Bureau in Cuba, and had a contentious
discussion about hurricane prediction. At
one point Dunwoody told Jover
"a cyclone has just
occurred in Galveston which no meteorologist predicted."
Jover, incredulous, paused a
moment. He said, slowly as one might
address the inmate of an asylum: "That cyclone is the same one which
passed over Cuba."
"No sir," Dunwoody snapped. "It cannot be; no cyclone ever can move
from Florida to Galveston." (p.
114)
Although Larson's book is straightforward history, there are
many parallels to contemporary events.
Larson does not draw them, which is to his credit, but it can readily be
seen that the mentality and often the methods of bureaucrats and government
leaders seem to have a timelessness that transcends historical contexts.
Governments and corporations find it extremely important to
control the flow and quality of information about public events. It is through the selective use of
information (or misinformation) that public attitudes and can be shaped and
behavior controlled. It is also how
credibility and authority are maintained.
We see this today in the government's handling of the Boston bombings,
9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Kennedy Assassination, the Lincoln
Presidency, and above all in the so-called "War on Terror", that
phantasm of the imagination that has no beginning, no end, and no fixed enemy,
except whom the government declares it to be.
It is the ultimate power grab because it does not admit contradiction by
any "facts." Actually, the
facts disappear. Reality becomes what
solely the government declares it to be.
This same pattern can be seen over a hundred years ago in the Galveston
Hurricane.
The biggest elephant in this room of denial and dismissal of
imminent catastrophe is climate change. This,
I think, gives this book special relevance to events occurring before our eyes
today. We often see today, in the media
and in the government, people who refuse to accept, in the face of overwhelming
evidence, that the earth's climate is changing, that it is changing rapidly,
that human activity is the cause of the change, and that the consequences are
potentially devastating on a scale heretofore unimaginable. It is very similar to the underestimation that
the people of Galveston and the officials of the U.S. Weather Service made
before the Galveston Hurricane. People
simply had no concept of the vast destructive potential of Nature and how
quickly it could be visited upon them.
We are in that same state of impoverished imagination and blissful
denial today before the specter of global warming. There are some people who know and are trying
to sound the warning. But they are
discounted and dismissed. The scenarios
of doom they paint are too fantastic to be credible. Yet once these forces are unleashed, or
rather, once they begin to break upon us, it will be too late and the outcome
will be inevitable.
I once shared some of my concerns about this with a friend
of mine, explaining to him that San Francisco draws most of its water from the
Hetch Hetchy Reservoir in the Sierra Nevada mountains. The pipeline from Hetch Hetchy to San
Francisco crosses a number of major geological fault lines, but the concern I
was sharing with him was that climate change may make our weather much drier
and warmer. If the Sierra snowpack were
to disappear, and the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir were to dry up, where will that
leave San Francisco for a water supply?
His response, "Well, I guess we'll just have to drink
Perrier."
Bureaucratic infighting and turf wars impaired the Weather
Service's functioning and weather forecasting became politicized. It is worth noting that an important
motivation for the improvement in weather forecasting was the military. Naval fleets were often sunk by storms, and
being able to understand and predict weather was important to maintaining
military strength and superiority. President
McKinley ordered the creation of the hurricane warning service in the Caribbean
on the eve of the Spanish-American War. "I
am more afraid of a West Indian hurricane than I am of the entire Spanish
Navy." (p. 74)
Once the storm began to break upon the city and people saw they
were in real trouble, there were divisions between people over how to
respond. There were sharp differences
among family members including Isaac Cline's over whether to move to a
presumably safer location or stay put.
These decisions were fateful.
Many families perished as a consequence of these decisions. Larson points out an interesting gender
divide. Men tended to stand pat and ride out the storm, where women wanted to
flee. Many of these were their last
marital arguments.
Much of the book is taken up with dramatic anecdotes of
survival and death. But many larger
issues of great interest are also discussed along the way.
One interesting small point that Larson only mentions in passing,
but I find worth drawing attention to, is a description of a walk Dr. Samuel
Young, Secretary of the Cotton Exchange made the night before the
hurricane.
Ahead, Murdoch's pier blazed
with light. The crests of incoming waves
seemed nearly to touch the lamps suspended over the surf. There would be no nude bathing tonight --
unlike other nights, when as many as
two hundred men would gather in the waves beyond the reach of the lamps and
swim frog-naked in the warm water. (p.
130)
Apparently, there was a vibrant homoerotic culture in
Galveston around the turn of the century.
I wonder how common such gatherings were across the United States at
that time, before the suppression of male-male sex became firmly established in
the culture?
After the storm there were so many corpses that disposing of
them became a major public health issue.
Cremation was a rare practice in 1900, but many bonfires were built
across Galveston to burn the many dead bodies from all over the city. There was racism. Rumors were spread of black people defiling
and robbing the bodies. Black males were
recruited at gunpoint to help load and dump bodies into the ocean for which
they were paid in whiskey (p. 239). But
the bodies were not weighted enough and by the end of the day many of the
bodies dumped into the ocean were washing back up on the beaches of
Galveston.
Larson notes the sources of relief contributions for
Galveston. The State of New York gave
the most at more than $93,000. New
Hampshire sent $1.
One of the final chapters details how the spin doctors went
to work in the aftermath to influence how the media portrayed the storm to the
public and the Weather Service's handling of it. A lot of it sounds very familiar.
[Willis] Moore continued to
portray the bureau as having expertly forecast and tracked the storm, and
credited in particular the West Indies Service. . . Most U.S. newspapers, unaware of the nuances
of the bureau's performance and inclined in those days to be more accepting of
official dogma, adopted Moore's view.
(p. 252)
Which was in direct contradiction to the facts.
Isaac Cline lost his wife in the storm -- arguably in
consequence of a decision he made to remain in his house. The subsequent lives of many of the
participants are noted by Larson, which makes for satisfying closure.
Willis Moore wrote at the time "Galveston should take
heart, as the chances are that not once in a thousand years would she be so
terribly stricken." (p.272) But
Galveston was hit by hurricanes in 1915, 1919, 1932, 1941, 1943, 1949, 1957,
1961, and 1983.
Toward the end of the twentieth
century, meteorologists still considered Galveston one to the most likely
targets for the next great hurricane disaster.
Unlike their peers in the administration of Willis Moore, they feared
that the American public might be placing too much trust in their
predictions. People seemed to believe
that technology had stripped hurricanes of their power to kill. No hurricane expert endorsed this view. None believed the days of mesoscale death were
gone for good. The more they studied
hurricanes, the more they realized how little they knew of their origins and
the forces that governed their travels.
There was talk that warming seas could produce hypercanes twice as
powerful as the Galveston hurricane. (p.
273)
This is the not so subtle message of this book for our time
that goes beyond its being a historical narrative or a gripping adventure
story. The conditions created by the
warming earth and the warming oceans will eventually bring storms upon us of a
much greater destructive scale than we have ever experienced. People of our time would do well to heed the
lessons of the city of Galveston in not being too smug and arrogant against the
monumental power of Nature, which can outstrip our imagination for sudden and
ruthless destruction. We like to believe
that the world is a congenial place and meant to support our lives. It does not have to be that way, and it can
change in a very short time. Reading the
story of Galveston can help bring that message home for whatever good it might
do, and Larson's account is as powerful and effective a recounting as any that
might be done.